India–UK counter-terrorism cooperation:
convergences and challenges
Cooperation on counter-terrorism is an important, but little-known, aspect of the India-UK security relationship. This was formally institutionalised in 2002 with the establishment of their foreign ministry-led Joint Working Group (JWG) on Terrorism. Continued and more sustained cooperation on counterterrorism will remain key to a meaningful bilateral strategic partnership.
Both
countries have a strong shared interest in preventing terror attacks on their mainland,
having suffered such attacks in the recent past. The deadliest single terror
act on British soil took place in London on 7 July 2005; one of the most
devastating terror attacks in India took place in Mumbai on 26-28 November
2008. With the Indian government now perceiving terrorism as the single biggest
threat to peace, security and development, counter-terrorism has emerged as one
of Indian Prime Minister Modi’s top priorities for bilateral and multilateral
cooperation.
Bilateral cooperation
In November
2015, during Modi’s visit to the UK, the new Defence, and International
Security Partnership (DISP) for the first time explicitly named the
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) (responsible for the November 2008 Mumbai terror attacks)
and the Haqqani network (responsible for the July 2008 suicide bombing of the
Indian embassy in Kabul), along with ISIL, al-Qaeda, and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen in
the context of disrupting their financial and tactical support. Both countries
also reiterated their call for Pakistan to bring the perpetrators of the 2008
Mumbai terror attack to justice. During Modi’s visit to the UK for the Commonwealth
Summit in 2018, Prime Ministers Modi and Theresia May “agreed
to strengthen cooperation to take decisive and concerted actions against
globally-proscribed terrorists and terror entities to protect our citizens,
including LeT, Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, Haqqani Network,
Al-Qaeda, ISIS (Da’esh) and their affiliates, as well as tackling the online
radicalisation and violent extremism which feeds this”.
At
the 13th meeting of the India-UK JWG on Counter-Terrorism in London on 25-26
November 2019, both sides reiterated their commitment to work together to
tackle terrorism in all its forms. This included countering radicalisation and
violent extremism, combating the financing of terrorism and preventing the use
of the internet for terrorist purposes.
Multilateral approaches
In a
significant development, the UK, along with the US and France, co-sponsored a
resolution in the UN in May 2019 to successfully declare the leader of the
Pakistan-based JeM terror organisation, Masood Azhar, as a “global terrorist” by the
ISIL and al-Qaeda Sanctions (1267) Committee of the UN Security Council. China
had blocked four previous attempts by the sanctions committee to blacklist
Azhar.
Another
critical aspect of India’s multilateral approach towards counter-terrorism is
its focus on preventing financing for terrorist organisations. Both India and
the UK are members of the 39-member international terror financing watchdog,
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). In January 2018, the UK and the US,
followed by Germany and France, co-sponsored a letter to the FATF nominating
Pakistan to the Grey List of the FATF. In October 2019, the FATF retained
Pakistan in the Grey List while expressing “serious concerns” with its lack of
progress addressing terror financing risks.
India
and the UK also participate in the ‘No Money for Terror’ Ministerial
Conference, seeking to promote international and regional cooperation and
improve capacity to combat the financing of terrorism. For the first time,
India will be hosting its third Ministerial Conference in 2020.
Differing perspectives
India
is concerned over the rise of Sikh radicalisation and pro-Khalistani extremism
among a small minority of the British Sikh community in the UK. In March 2016,
the ban on the International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF), proscribed as a
terrorist organisation in 2001, was lifted. During Modi’s April 2018 visit to
the UK, anti-India Sikh and Kashmiri separatist protestors tore the Indian flag
in London’s Parliament Square; and in August 2018, the US and Canada-based
Sikhs for Justice (SFJ) – seeking a referendum next year for the establishment
of Khalistan, an independent Sikh state – held a large demonstration. The
violent anti-India demonstrators outside the Indian High Commission in London
on 15 August and 3 September 2019 comprised several pro-Khalistan groups,
protesting India’s 5 August 2019 decision on Kashmir. The Indian government
continues to seek the extradition of select British Sikh activists charged with
terror attacks in India. The danger is that these developments could lead or be
supportive of a terror attack in India as well as the emergence of sectarian
strife within the British Indian community.
India
and the UK also differ over official Pakistani complicity in terrorism. India
blames the Pakistan army’s powerful Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)
Directorate for planning and coordinating the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks,
alongside the actions of their ‘proxies’, the JeM and the LeT, in terror
attacks in India. The UK acknowledges that ISI has had a role in supporting and
funding the LeT and the JeM but is not able to find evidence to directly blame
the ISI.
Opportunities for convergences
Nonetheless,
there remain significant opportunities to develop and deepen India-UK bilateral
and multilateral counter-terrorism cooperation and collaboration for mutual
benefit. It is a pity that the much-publicised and policy-relevant June 2019
report by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the UK parliament titled ‘Building Bridges: Reawakening UK-India
Ties’ did not explore avenues for such potential
collaboration.
These
could include a regular exchange of information, mutual capacity-building
efforts, sharing of best practices and technologies, mutual legal assistance
and working through the UN. There should also be ‘actionable’ exchanges of
intelligence related to terror acts, money laundering and related crimes and
terrorism financing. Terrorist groups such as the Dawood company, led by Dawood
Ibrahim, the mastermind of the 1993 Mumbai bombings, should be formally named
in future joint statements. There could be discussion on India’s focus on
‘de-radicalisation’ (in contrast to the UK’s ‘counter-radicalisation’) in
relation to religious extremism, as well as an emphasis on countering the
financing of radicalisation and on-line radicalisation. Finally, a curb on
pro-Khalistani activities in the UK will continue to be a key factor in
strengthening bilateral counter-terrorism partnership.

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